incident at Cascade Falls Cave

Date
16th Mar 1974
Publication
ACA 1974 p. 10
Cave
Cascade Falls Cave
State
Kentucky
County
Unknown
Country
United States of America
Category
Cave
Incident type
Caver fall
Group type
Other
Group size
Unknown
Aid type
Unknown
Source
Unknown
Incident flags
 

Injured cavers

Name Age Sex Injuries Injured areas
Martin, Robin 18 Male Hypothermia Not recorded

Incident report

Saturday, 16 March 1974 Larry Novikoff, Jenny Meinhart, Ken Tankersley, and Robin Martin (18) entered the cave at 5:30 p.m. to deposit fluorescein dye for a hydrology experiment. The group caved for 5 hours, ate a snack, and then started to depart. They had left a safety line in an 8-foot chimney about 800 feet from the entrance. Each caver used a prusik sling and a figure-eight chest harness of 2-inch webbing for a self-belay. Martin was the last person to climb out. Although he had been caving for over 4 years, he did not have much experience with chimneys of this type. Martin's foot slipped because he failed to maintain enough pressure against the wall while raising the harness. He was immediately caught by the chest sling which came over his nose and mouth, knocking off his helmet and glasses which he caught. The chin strap in his helmet had been broken in the fall.

Robin Martin was hanging in a vertical position and was unable to regain a foothold. He was not able to tie a loop in the rope in which to stand. Attempts at pulling him out also failed. Tankersley climbed down into the pit and offered his shoulder as a foothold. He then untied Martin's safety harness and lowered him to the base of the pit. A candle and a butane lighter provided some warmth as Tankersley and Novikoff left for additional prusik slings in their car. Upon returning, they found Martin in a weak condition due to the cold. It was necessary for them to move the prusik knots for him.

Analysis: "The circumstances which led to this accident were my weakened condition, the belled-out shape of the pit, and the choice of a wrong ascending set-up. Since I had not been in this cave before, I didn't know it would be as strenuous as it was. Had I known, I probably wouldn't have gone. As shown by this accident, we should each have brought the equipment we felt safe with; even for an 8-foot pit." (Martin)

"The most direct cause was one of exhaustion. Robin had done strenuous work and climbing before entering the cave. As also observed, he did not have knowledge of chimneying and did it wrong even after on-the-spot instructions. He chimneyed on an angle instead of being perpendicular to the walls, resulting in foot slippage and the fall. "A more efficient belay system could have been used, or simply bring[ing] ascenders may have resulted in the event not taking place. These were not brought due to ignorance in thinking it was easy because it was only 8 feet." (Tankersley)

"This situation could have been completely avoided if proper precautions and equipment had been used. A safety knot and chest harness should never have been used. Although everything we could think of was done, even with our knowledge of climbing, conditions proved to be very difficult. Although Robin was removed successfully, it is quite evident now that there were many things which could have been done had they been thought of at the time. Even with knowledge of rescue, it becomes almost useless when unprepared. All my equipment was in a different car. The entire incident was a result of improper equipment and preparation on the part of the leader, and disregard of what could result. People tend to disregard safety procedures just because the situation looks safe and easy. The potential danger-although it may be recognized-i disregarded as being not likely to happen. Had this been a vertical trip, proper equipment would have been used." (Novikoff)

Many cavers and climbers seem to believe they are safe if they have either an upper belay or else a prusik self-belay. Often thought is not given to where a person would come to rest should he fall. A belayer can usually, but not always, lower the victim to a ledge or the floor. If this is not possible or if a self-belay is used, the victim hangs by the rope until he can be freed either by himself or by one of his companions. This is not only uncomfortable but dangerous. Hanging by a rope around the chest can cause a person to lose consciousness within minutes, and in some situations, be fatal within an hour. Several tragic accidents of this type have been reported in the mountaineering literature. Some methods for reducing the danger to the victim of a belayed fall are: 1) climbers should carry spare prusik slings or jumars for self-rescue, 2) belayers should be able to lower (or raise) the victim to a safe position, and 3) slings and harnesses should be made of wide material in order to spread the weight and increase comfort. Robin Martin had been under severe strain from the pressure on his chest, causing his strength to fail and his hands to go numb. In addition, spray from a waterfall contributed to loss of body heat. Under these conditions, someone should have stayed with the victim to keep him warm. When Tankersley returned with a set of prusiks, he found Martin shivering and pale as a sheet. Martin stated later that his temperature had dropped to a point where he could no longer feel the cold; he was beginning to feel very comfortable and was starting to fall asleep. Although the victim was instructed on what he should do, he could not think to put his foot in the sling. All these symptoms indicate that the victim had developed hypothermia-a lowering of the body's inner core temperature. If not diagnosed and treated quickly, hypothermia can be fatal. The symptoms, treatment, and prevention of hypothermia are discussed in many recent mountaineering and caving books such as: Ferber, Peggy (Ed.) (1974) Mountaineering, The Freedom of the Hills. Halliday, William R. (1974) American Caves and Caving. Lathrop, Theodore G. (1970) Hypothermia: Killer of the Unprepared. Mitchell, Dick. (1972) Mountaineering First Aid.

References

  1. Martin, Robin. (1974) "Accident Report I." Electric Caver. Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 25-26
  2. Tankersley, Ken. (1974) "Accident Report II." Electric Caver. Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 27-28
  3. Novikoff, Larry. (1974) "Accident Report III." Electric Caver. Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 29-30
This record was last updated on 27th Apr 2024 at 23:11 UTC.