Name | Age | Sex | Injuries | Injured areas |
---|---|---|---|---|
Bush, Gary | 45 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Hissong, Jack | 45 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Gardner, Jeffery | 27 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Gratsch, Mary | 26 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Ramsey, Jacques | 26 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Rocklin, Mark | 26 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Vedder, Jill | 24 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
Wisher, John | 36 | Not recorded | Not recorded | Not recorded |
At about 11:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 23, a group of eight cavers entered Precinct 11 Cave in Rockcastle County, Kentucky. These were co-leaders Gary Bush (45) and Jack Hissong (45), Jeffery Gardner (27), Mary Gratsch (26), Jacques Ramsey (26), Mark Rocklin (26), Jill Vedder (24), and John Wisher (36). The trip was part of an ongoing mapping project by the Greater Cincinnati Grotto. Of the eight, six were experienced, while two were novices.
Over four miles of passage had been mapped in Precinct 11 since its discovery in 1979. The entrance passage is about 200 feet long, and is an overflow to the main cave stream. Under normal conditions 100 feet of this is a near sump, 34 inches high at the lowest point with 30 inches of water depth. Beyond this passage are the larger, higher level passages of the main cave. At the entrance pool was a staff gauge to indicate the entrance passage water level. A level of 21 inches would indicate that the passage was sumped. An emergency equipment cache had been placed beyond the sump area.
It had been raining lightly the previous night and day and the rain continued as the group prepared to enter. The gauge stood at 18 inches (three inches of air space). The flooding possibilities had been discussed at camp Friday evening and the experienced members felt they "knew" the cave well enough to feel it was safe under present conditions. Two of the original ten were not convinced, however, and elected to pursue other objectives. At 11:00 a.m. the group of eight entered the cave.
A National Weather Service bulletin Friday night predicted rain and possible thundershowers in the Rockcastle County area for Saturday, diminishing in the evening. A low pressure system was moving east across the gulf states with the possibility of heavy rains. Indeed, up to two inches had fallen in some areas of the county by early Sunday.
Once inside the entrance passage, the group went through the normal procedure of changing to dry clothes, brought along in plastic bags. Two had wetsuit tops. They then split up to pursue various objectives. At about 7:00 p.m. they rejoined and started out. As they neared the entrance passage, it was obvious that the flow was up. They pushed on to a total sump, then retreated to the high ledge with the emergency cache and settled in to wait out the flood. Their dry clothes had gotten wet so these were wrung out and put back on to dry. Plastic bags were put on and extra equipment was inventoried two plastic bags, candles, carbide, two cans of Spam, one candy bar, and two bags of M & M's.
The two who had not entered the cave became concerned when Sunday dawned with no sign of their companions. At the cave they found the gauge showing twice normal depth. At 2:50 p.m. they called for help. The Kentucky Cave and Rock Rescue Team (KCRRT) in Bowling Green was alerted and various cavers and divers were contacted. KCRRT personnel arrived at 8:30 p.m. Sunday, assessed the situation and called NCRC, requesting more divers.
Rescue squad divers, untrained in cave diving, were present but deemed unsuitable and were not used. Local media coverage began at this time.
At 4:00 a.m. on Monday, George Veni arrived. At 5:30 he made a recon dive with standard gear plus one day pack and an ammo box containing food, stove and hot packs. Veni encountered 100 feet of sump, partly a crawl, with visibility of one to one-and-a-half feet. He proceeded 700 feet, mostly walking, to a second sump, dove this and a third, before turning back at a fourth sump. At sump one he located a side passage which was the correct route, which appeared to sump also. Tying off his guideline, he exited the cave (11:30 a.m.).
The possibility of a major disaster and a lack of other newsworthy items now greatly increased news coverage.
Early that morning a request had been made for pumps and two coal mining companies, Mountain Clay and Lee Company, supplied five 500 gallon-per-minute pumps; four pumps plus crews arrived at 5:30 a.m. and the fifth at 10:30 a.m. These were set in operation at 9:30 and soon lowered the water level several inches at which level it remained steady, still sumped.
The trapped cavers, meanwhile, experienced at least some difficulty in keeping warm. After the first day in the 53 degree cave they began huddling together to conserve and share body heat. Still, a couple of them later described shivering nearly all the time. At around noon on Monday the water level had noticeably decreased, so three headed down to have a look at the sump. They found it still closed but encountered Veni's dive line and could hear the pumps working outside. They left a note and retreated to the bivouac.
Veni had been startled by the sound of the pumps while exiting from his recon and had dropped his guide reel. No further dive could proceed until another reel arrived. At 3:30 p.m. Monday more cave divers arrived, were briefed, and at 4:45 p.m. Maegerlein and Forbes entered, followed Veni's line and found the note left by the trapped cavers, indicating that they were all safe. The divers returned with the note. At 7:30 p.m. Hudson and Wilson entered with supplies for the victims while the first pair of divers entered, retrieved gear stashed by Veni, and took that to the trapped group. At 10:00 p.m. Hudson and Wilson brought the group warm clothes and sleeping bags. The group was told to expect to be brought out at 1:00 p.m. Tuesday.
Meanwhile, at 9:00 p.m. a six-inch, 2500 gallon per minute pump was installed. Difficulty was experienced keeping the intake from cavitating, especially since carbon monoxide levels from pump exhaust were high around the entrance restricting divers from working on the hoses for more than ten minutes at a time. The bigger pump soon began to lower the water level.
The last dive, at 10:00 p.m., revealed that the exhaust fumes were entering the cave so Lee Company workers built a canvas curtain around the pumps allowing fire department fans to keep the air around the entrance fresh.
At 5:00 a.m. Tuesday another six-inch pump was installed. By 9:00 a.m. the water level was judged low enough to bring the trapped cavers out. It was decided to go ahead and do so since the bearings were going on one of the six-inch pumps. As soon as the victims were reached, four were started out with a diver staying with the other four. The first four came out at 11:00 a.m. and the second group at noon, with two-and-a-half to three inches of air space. They had been trapped some seventy hours. Fifteen minutes after the pumps were shut down the cave was again sumped.
The cavers emerged to prolonged media coverage, coverage that had continued throughout their entrapment. Much editorializing has occurred in the caver press because of this and most express dismay and the wish to avoid such in the future. How to do this? Simple don't get trapped in caves! For no matter how simple the situation is, the masses appreciate a good story and the news media is only too ready to provide it. In the case here, the cavers must be criticized they entered a cave with only four inches of air space during bad weather and their only knowledge of flooding was personal experience, not detailed hydrologic analysis. The reaction of a cave to a given weather situation is not necessarily simple and may never be understood through casual observation.
In other words, the news media didn't create the situation, the cavers did.
So why did they go ahead? The psychology of such was discussed in a Dayton Area Speleological Society (DASS) editorial. For one thing, you are coerced if you have only one objective cave, no alternatives. You are also coerced if the objective is very important to the group. Also, the fact that they had gotten away with entering during light rain before gave them the confidence that they could do it again.
The reaction of a cave to rain will depend on recent conditions to a large extent, as the Schindel report states. If the ground is saturated, the effect of a light rain is much greater than if the ground is dry. Moreover, once you are in the cave, you won't know if the rain has gotten worse.
The DASS editorial suggests that, should the pumps have failed, or not been available, SCUBA methods would have had to be used to evacuate the group since more rain was forecast for Wednesday and Thursday. Schindel, et. al., point out that the peculiarity of the entrance passage water, being blocked from the main flow of the cave stream by rocks and sediment, is all that allowed the pumps to lower the water level. In most circumstances the pumping would not work.
To quote the Schindel report, "A good, safe rule of thumb is to completely avoid caving in base level passages during periods of questionable weather conditions.
The extensive news coverage revealed some interesting information concerning the cost of rescues. The rescue involved more than 150 individuals State Police, volunteer firemen, amateur radio operators, divers, mine workers, etc. The Rockcastle County Rescue Squad estimated their costs at $7,000 to $8,000, while the pumping equipment was estimated by Mountain Clay and Lee Co. to cost $15,000 to $20,000. So the bad judgement regarding the question of possible entrapment in this case cost society tens of thousands of dollars. And that spent by emergency relief organizations on such occasions is that much not available for later disasters. And don't forget, you can't tell someone not to rescue you - they will anyway, for our society demands it.
A group of eight cavers were stranded in Precinct 11 Cave due to flooding after ignoring the risk of heavy rain, leading to a 70-hour rescue operation.